Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing Scope of Federal Jurisdiction: The Colorado River Decision Robert H. Abrams*
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court decided Colorado Riosr Water Conservation District u: United States,1 holding that principles of judicial administration relating to "contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions'" command that the federal courts abjure congressionally granted, previously attached jurisdiction of federal claims to reserved water rights. By establishing state courts as the primary forum for adjudicating all water rights within state boundaries, Colorado River dramatically extends state courts' control of reserved rights claims, including rights claimed by the federal government as trustee for American Indian lands withdrawn by treaty or other congressional action.
Unfortunately, Colorado River will have harmful consequences for proper determination of reserved rights claims. Although the decision did not abolish concurrent jurisdiction, it virtually assures adjudication of all claims in state courts, which will have strong incentives to discriminate against federal claims in favor of state and private uses. Any jsignificant diminution of federal water rights hampers the proper development of federal lands and interferes with congressional policies. Further, the problems inherent in state adjudication of reserved water rights are especially acute when Indian claims are involved, because the states will give inadequate attention to the unique status and problems of the Indians.
• 
1111
This Article explores the impact of Colorado Riller and examines critically the Court's choice to remit to state courts claims involving federally created Indian water rights. Part I of the Article traces the development of federal-state water law relations and analyzes the Colorado Riller decision in light of this developmenr.' Part II examines the jurisdictional implications of the decision and concludes that most, if not all, reserved rights cases will now be tried in state courts. Parts III and IV explore the problems of exclusive state control of these claims. Part III describes the justifications for a federal forum in reserved rights cases and suggests that the policies underlying the doctrine of protective jurisdiction be applied to preserve federal adjudication of reserved rights. Part IV discusses the special status of American Indians, concluding that this status warrants reconsideration of the Colorado Riller doctrine. DECISION 
THE Colorado Riller

A. Deoeiopmen: ofthe Federal-State Relationship in Western Water Law
During the 19th Century the arid West developed the doctrine of prior appropriation to govern water rights, rather than adopting the pure riparianism found throughout the East. In contrast to riparian emphasis on abutting owners' rights to reasonable use of undiminished stream flOWS,4 the prior appropriation system favors users who first divert water for beneficial use, regardless of proximity to the stream.P Shortly after the Civil War, Congress recognized rights created by beneficial appropriation of water on public land." In 1877, Congress passed the Desert Land Act,? making state law the exclusive source for obtaining appropriative water rights on public lands." The Act thus severed water rights from property rights, which federal law still governed." Although federal and state interests coincided in establishment of a unified prior appropriation system, the governments have occasionally disagreed about ownership and management of unappropriated waters on federal lands. 10 One important area of dispute has involved federal claims of reserved water rights-rights that vest in the federal government when land is withdrawn from the public domain and reserved for a specific federal purpose. 11 The Supreme Court has always upheld federal claims to reserved water rights and has tacitly accepted the continuing federal interest in unappropriated waters of the public domain under the doctrine of Winters u: United States. 12 This judicial vindication of federal claims has been a source of substantial frustration to the states for several reasons. First, recognition of federal reserved rights restricts the exercise of state sovereignty and in some instances preempts provisions of state constitutions or statutes. 13 Second, these rights interfere with efficient operation of state prior appropriation systems. Because federal rights can arise by withdrawal of public domain lands without any physical appropriation and application to a beneficial use.l" other water users may be unable to ascertain the amount of unappropriated water. State law appropriators acquiring rights after a federal 8. &e, e.g., California Ore. Power Co. v, Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64 (1935 (1924) : "The relation of the federal government to the state government in the reclamation of desert lands arises out of the fact that the federal government owns the lands, and Congress is invested by the Constitution with the power of disposing of the same, while the state has been given jurisdiction to provide for the appropriation and beneficial use of the waters of the state which necessarily includes a use for the reclamation of such lands." reservation receive only a defeasible property right until the extent of the reserved federal right is established.P Although the Supreme Court recently ruled in Cappaert o. UnitedStates16 that the federal government should be awarded water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.F such a yardstick offers little predictability.l" Third, federal reserved rights have in the past frustrated state attempts to administer water law in their own courts.
Jurisdictional disputes have arisen continually because claimants of federal reserved rights seldom have been amenable to state court adjudication while the states' own interests favor the state forum. In recent years, however, the scope of state jurisdiction has increased. After passage of the McCarran Amendment in 1952,19 many federal claimants were unable to argue that sovereign immunity necessitated federal jurisdiction. The Colorado River decision further limits the ability of federal claimants to resist state court adjudication.P
B. The Colorado River Setting and Decision
The Colorado River litigation involved federal lands reserved from the public domain in Colorado. Some of the reserved lands were devoted to specific federal uses while some of the reserved lands were Indian reservations, for which the United States claimed water rights as trustee. " In 1972, prior federal district court seeking a declaration of all its water rights in the region.P' The federal government was then served as a defendant in the Colorado water courr" in a suit involving rights in the same waters claimed in the federal action. The district court subsequently granted a motion to dismiss the federal suit based on the abstention doctrine and reasons of "comity. This official must also compile a master tabulation of appropriative priorities in each water district. Id. § 37-92-401. Claimants who believe their rights have been omitted from the tabulation must object, id § 37-92-401(3), (5), or risk the effective abandonment of their claim of right, id: § 37-92-402. Because the statute has been amended recently, it is uncertain whether the concept of abandonment effectuated by the statutory scheme is intended to apply to federal reserved rights not actually the subject ofstatutory adjudication. Nor is it clear that a construction eliminating reserved rights would be constitutionally permissible. his opinion he first recognized that the McCarran Amendment mandated concurrent jurisdiction for determinations of federal reserved rights held on behalf of Indians.P? Although he reasoned that the abstention doctrine was inapplicable in this case," he concluded that the action should be dismissed because principles ofjudicial administration suggested that Colorado's comprehensive system for adjudication of water rights could best determine federal claimants' rights. Justice Brennan held that the McCarran Amendment established concurrent jurisdiction for most claims involving federal reserved water rights." The Amendment allows the federal government to be sued in state court when government-owned water rights are at issue. 34 The passage of the Amendment was aimed at encouraging judicial and administrative efficiency by consolidating all water rights controversies in a single forum. Legislative history suggests the Amendment was meant to grant permissive state jurisdiction rather than to remove the federal jurisdictional grant of28 U.S.C. § 1345. As now codified, the McCarran Amendment reads: "(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable thereto by reason ofits sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States in any such suit. 
&t'United
Abstention doctrine.
After concluding that concurrent jurisdiction existed, Justice Brennan rejected the district court's determination that the abstention doctrine warranted dismissal of the suit. Abstention is for Justice Brennan a very narrow exception to the "virtually unflagging obligation" of the federal courts to exercise their congressionally specified jurisdiction. See Allegheny Co. v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959) . Moreover, Justice Brennan has embraced the "federal primacy" doctrine, which asserts that after Reconstruction the federal courts" 'ceased to be restricted tribunals of fair dealing between citizens of different states and became the prima1yand powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States. ' ruled that a federal district court should stay its proceedings pending state adjudication of the meaning of "public use" in the New Mexico Constitution/" The per curiam opinion in Kaiser called the issue novel and "of vital concern" to the state/" In contrast, the federal suit in Colorado River involved a state's settled system for quantifying appropriation rights.'" The difficult legal issue in Colorado River was not a novel question of state law, but rather a federal question concerning the quantity of water reserved to the Indians."?
Justice Brennan noted that abstention might be warranted if review of a federal question would disrupt a state's efforts to establish a coherent policy to deal with a matter of substantial public concern.71 Although federal reserved claims might conflict with state law, "the mere potential for conflict" was insufficient to warrant staying federal proceedings." Justice Brennan's determination that potential conflict with state-created rights does not justify the suspension of federal proceedings represents a vigorous effort by the Court to limit termination of federal suits on abstention grounds. Because abstention decisions involve consideration of the state interest in state -court climate and soil, which render necessary these different laws in the States so situated." Id:at 370.
65. In Clark, which dealt with private condemnation in the context of irrigation rights, the Court showed a strong preference for deferring to state courts: ''Where the use is asserted to be public, and the right of the individual to condemn land ... is the result of some peculiar condition of the soil or climate, or other peculiarity of the state, where the right of condemnation is asserted under a state statute, we are always, where it can be done fairly, strongly inclined to hold with the state courts, when they uphold a state statute providing for such condemnation. The validity of such statutes may sometimes depend upon many different facts . .
• and the state courts may be assumed to be exceptionally familiar with them. . . . [State courts] understand the situation which led to the demand for the enactment of the statute, and they also appreciate the results upon the growth and prosperity of the State, which in all probability would flow from a denial of its validity. proceedings, this rejection of abstention in Colorado River implies that the nature of the state interest should not be dispositive of the important issues presented in selecting the appropriate forum for determination of reserved rights claims.
Judicial administration" dismissal
After deciding abstention doctrine was inapplicable, Justice Brennan held that considerations of "wise judicial administration" justified dismissal of the Colorado Rioer federal suit.
73 His opinion offered precedents for four types of considerations which might warrant such a dismissal.?" (1) the rule governing in rem and quasi-inrem actions that grants exclusive jurisdiction to the court that first obtains custody of the property;75 (2) inconvenience of the federal forumj?" (3) avoidance of piecemeal litigation;"? and (4) 74. He noted that no single factor was "necessarily determinative." 424 U.S. at 818. Instead, "a carefully considered judgment taking into account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the combination of such factors counselling against that exercise is required. 79. 424 U.S. at 819-20. Justice Brennan never explicitly addressed the second factor-convenience-but he may have impliedly done so in alluding to the distance between the federal court and Division No. 7 and the resulting impracticality of federal jurisdiction. Seenotes 99-102 irifraand accompanying text. He also failed to explicitly discuss the fourth factor-the order of establishing jurisdiction-though he may have been referring to it when he declared that the federal suit was ..effectively "antedated" by the state court proceeding, four other administrative considerations present in this caser'? (1) the absence of any federal district 'court proceedings beyond the filing of the complaint; (2) extensive involvement of state water rights involving 1,000 sued defendants; (3) the 300-mile distance between the federal court in Denver and the state court in Durango; and (4) the federal government's participation in state water rights proceedings in other parts of Colorado. Close inspection suggests, however, that his findings were based on a number of misunderstandings about the nature of the state proceedings.
Exclusivepropertyjurisdiction andavoidingpiecemeal litigation . Justice
Brennan linked the two considerations of exclusive jurisdiction for in rem and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction and the avoidance of piecemeal litigation. He perceived in the McCarran Amendment a clear federal policy favoring avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system," viewing this policy as "akin" to that underlying the rule of exclusive jurisdiction in actions in rem and quasi-in-rem.F By joining these two considerations, he apparently sought to overcome the Amendment's silence about the proper forum.P Even if one accepts the somewhat loose manner in which he linked the underlying policies of the general rule regarding property jurisdiction and the McCarran Amendment, more fundamental objections remain.P" First, the exclusive jurisdiction rule used in property actions is inapplicable to this case. As Justice Stewart's dissent pointed out, the rule only applies "when exclusive control over the subject matter because the latter was merely part of a continuing state adjudication. 424 U.S. at 819-20. It is worth noting that Justice Brennan developed this "antedating jurisdiction" argument sua sponte. is necessary to effectuate a court's judgment."85 The federal district court in Colorado River did not need control of the river in order to ascertain federal reserved rights." The questions of federal law before the Court concerned only the existence of such rights along with their scope and effective date." Second, federal adjudication of the Indian claims would not create piecemeal litigation. Unlike the prior appropriation claims of other parties to the state suit, determination of Indian and other reserved rights turned not on actual diversion and beneficial use but rather on the federal government's original intent to reserve a certain amount of water to support federal and Indian lands/" Thus, a determination of Indian reserved rights in state court would require separate proceedings prior to the overall adjudication of rights in the river system/" Because virtually the same process of separate adjudication of reserved rights would take place in either forum, Justice Brennan's assertion that federal litigation of the Indian rights would create piecemeal litigation appears to have little merit.P? Moreover, a final judgment by either court almost certainly would be given res 85 1973 ). This renunciation of jurisdiction has been based on several rheories-s-deference to pre-existing state jurisdiction in rem, incomplete diversity among all interested parties and exclusivity of state court jurisdiction over probate matters. Su id. While the precise scope of this renunciation is difficult to define, its purpose is to consolidate all claims against the estate in a forum capable of adjudicating the potentially conflicting demands of claimants. The rationale underlying this renunciation of diversity jurisdiction is thus analogous to the perceived intent of the McCarran Amendment's consent to inclusion of federal rights claims in general state adjudications. In the probate context, however, federal courts areallowed to exercise jurisdiction in suits against the estate or other claimants, but only to the extent that the suit seeks a determination of the validity of the claim, and "the federal court does not interfere with the probate proceedings or assume general jurisdiction of the probate or control of the property in custody of the state court. Absence o/flderalproceedings. Justice Brennan next pointed to the lack of proceedings in federal district court as another reason to dismiss the suit.
9 2 Although lack of federal proceedings of substance on the merits serves as a benchmark under one type of abstention," he cited no precedent for its application in Colorado River. As the dissent noted, the lack of proceedings merely signified the speed with which the district court had granted dismissal.P"
Extensive involvement 0/state water nghts. Although 1,000 defendants had been named in the federal suit, complex multiple party litigation involving extensive state water rights was not inevitable.. Once federal jurisdiction attached over the reserved rights claim, the federal court could simply have decided the priority date of the federal claims and the quantity of water to be accorded them.i" Resolution of the federal question did not require the federal court to declare the relative rights of any subsequent state law appropriators or those of any prior state law appropriators." Although jurisdiction to hear those cases would be allowed by the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction." the district court could have declined to decide these issues/" Thus, the specter of the federal court replacing the Colorado courts as the primary arbiter of the prior appropriation system was largely illusory.
will be neither more nor less 'piecemeal. ' Distance between the courts. The Court noted the 300-mile distance between the center of Water Division No.7 in Durango and the federal district court in Denverr" apparently considering this a significant inconvenience for efficient adjudication. In contrast, the dissent concluded that 300 miles is not great, given modern transport.100 Moreover, the federal district court had express statutory authority to sit in Durango,'?' making it potentially as convenient a forum as the state court which sits there perrnanently.l'"
Federal involvement in earlier Colorado proceedings. Finally, Justice Brennan pointed to earlier federal participation without objection in similar Colorado water adjudications.I'" But the Court was unclear why previous federal participation in state court supported the dismissal of the issue from federal court. As the dissent reprovingly observed, the government retained its right to bring suit in federal court, unless the Court was creating a new type of waiver. 104 
II. RELEGATION OF RESERVED RIGHTS CLAIMS TO STATE COURTS: THE JURISDICTIONAL CONSEQUENCE OF Colorado River
The Court's decision in Colorado River represents a substantial contraction of federal jurisdiction. Although the Court technically did not abolish federal concurrent jurisdiction over reserved rights claims.I?" the opinion reaches this result in effect by dictating federal dismissal in deference to the state forum in virtually every case 106 where a comprehensive state system exists for adjudication of water rights.'?" As the impact of Colorado River becomes more widely recog-99. &e424 U.S. at 820. 100. Id. at 824 n.6 (Stewart, j., dissenting). Justice Stewart also doubted that live testimony by water district residents would be required. Id.
101. &e 28 U.S.C. § 85 (1970) .Justice Stewart notes this possibility in his dissent. &e 424 U.S. at 824 n.6 (Stewart, j., dissenting).
102. The authority which the majority opinion cited on the question of convenience, Gulf Oil Corp. v, Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), see424 U.S. at 818, actually provided scant support. Gilbert presented a far more substantial convenience interest and, more important, a choice between ftderal forums. Choosing one over the other thus did not impinge upon the federal courts' "unflagging obligation" to exercise the jurisdiction provided by Congress. Assured by Colorado River that state "general adjudication" proceedings will be the primary forum for all water disputes, western states have strong incentives to pass statutes which will allow 'them to assume jurisdiction over the vital question of water distribution. Each of the prior appropriation states has already established a system of special proceedings to adjudicate water rights disputes.P? If any of these state systems fall short of the Eagle Counljl "general adjudication" requirement.P? the Colorado system is available as a paradigm. Because of the close relationship between water rights and economic development.'!' each state has an interest in establishing a single forum to adjudicate all claims in a unitary proceeding. Further, states have strong selfish reasons to construe the scope of federal reserved rights narrowly, since these rights clash directly with the prior appropriation system.P" To the extent that state legislatures conclude that important state interests will receive a more favorable hearing in state court, systems of "general adjudication" are likely to be adopted.
B. The Decline ofRemoval Jurisdiction
In the Eagle Counljl decisions, the Court allowed state water rights claimants to choose the state forum 113 without considering whether the federal government could successfully seek removal of the action to the federal courts.I'" In the wake of Colorado River, removal ap- 123 These provide that removal petitions be joined by all defendants unless the claim of the defendant seeking removal is "separate and independent.t"?" The district court ruled that the federal claims were not separate and independent.F" citing Colorado Riller,126 and noted that only one defendant, the federal government, had petitioned 126. See424 U.S. at 819. 127. Because water rights of private defendants are lessened by whatever amount of federal reserved water exists, those defendants would probably prefer trial in state courts, which are likely to be hostile to federal claims, seenotes 13-20 supra and accompanying text; notes 137-40 ziifTa and accompanying text.
C. Restricted Federal Review
Because Colorado River delegates federal reserved rights cases to state courts, federal appellate review will also be severely curtailed. Formal review of these state court adjudications is available only through a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
128 Access to the Court is extremely limited, and certiorari may not be granted. Even if the Court elects to review, it may be hampered by the approach of the state court below.P" Because certiorari will lie only from a final decision of the highest state court with jurisdiction over the case.P" the claimant of federal rights must exhaust state remedies entirely before seeking Supreme Court review. Given the complexity of water adjudications, a state's highest court could easily find error requiring further proceedings below. Thus, substantial investment of time and money may be necessary before a case can even qualify for federal review. While some limited authority exists for invocation of more speedy review to avoid expense and delay,':" the water litigation may not fall within the extraordinary class of cases entitled to more immediate review.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A FEDERAL FORUM IN RESERVED RIGHTS CASES
In practical terms, Colorado River means that most, if not all, future adjudication of federal reserved water rights will occur in state courts.P'' In creating this result, the Court did not confront the strong countervailing interests of the United States and the American Indians in presenting their reserved rights claims to a federal fo- rum.P" In his dissent, Justice Stevens noted the anomaly of holding that the United States may not litigate a federal claim in a federal court having jurisdiction over it. 13 4 The other dissenting Justices asserted that federal courts are more likely than state courts to be familiar with Indian treaties and federal water law. 135 They also noted that the Supreme Court had long recognized the importance of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control. 136 The majority ignored the need to preserve minimal access to federal court, erroneously concluding that state courts were competent to protect these vital federal and Indian interests.
A. The lnadequaqy ofPninary State Court Control ofReserved Rights Cases
For a variety of reasons, state courts may prove incapable of protecting the important federal policies that underlie the reserved rights doctrine'P? and will deprive the United States and Indian groups of vital water rights. The very concept of federal reserved rights is antithetical to the prior appropriation systems in the western states, because reserving unquantified amounts of water can compromise the entire system.P" No subsequent appropriator takes with assurance against reduction of the water supply at some future date when the reservation is exercised. In many parts of the West, the assured yearly water supply is virtually exhausted by present appropriations.P? Exercise of heretofore unused reserved rights will force some present users to do without water and will deter potential users from settling in the area. To the extent that reserved rights can be narrowly construed, important state economic interests are served:
133. Justice Brennan twice notes the possibility of the choice of forum creating different effects on federal interests. In interpreting the McCarran Amendment to encompass Indian as well as other reserved rights, he states: "Mere subjection of Indian rights to legal challenge in state court. . . would no more imperil those rights than would a suit brought by the Government in district court for their declaration . . . ." 424 U.S. at 812. This claim seems too optimistic. &e notes 193-208 ziyTaandaccompanying text. Later, in limiting the Court's holding, Justice Brennan says that it might be a different case "if the state proceeding were in some respect inadequate to resolve the federal claims." Id. at 820. But he fails to elaborate on the consequences of this reservation, and the opinion therefore holds little promise for guaranteeing future access as a matter of right to the United States or the Indians to protect their claims and the underlying federal interests.
134 disruption and dislocation incident to termination of existing uses are avoided and actual economic use of water can grow to the limits of supply. Thus, state judges in water rights adjudications will be under strong pressure to rule against the federal government's reserved rights claims. 140
Apart from concern about bias in the state court system,'?' additional reasons exist to preserve access to the federal forum. First, federal reserved rights claims are extremely important and their adjudication is likely to have a significant influence on federal policies regarding resource management and environmental protection. 142 When reserved rights claims are asserted by the government as trustee for American Indians, additional concerns are involved. The disputed rights have an overwhelming effect on the lives of the Indians asserting them,143 and their resolution is in part a measure of the sanctity of national commitments made to the Indians. Second, Indian reserved rights present profound questions of federalism 144-seldom clearly enunciated. In interpreting the existence and magnitude of reserved rights, the federal courts have the necessary familiarity and expertise to resolve complex questions of federal statutory interpretation or of the original Indian-federal water rights agreement. 145 Deference to this expertise is particularly appropriate when the precise nature of the rights claimed is largely dependent on federal policy choices made when the lands were withdrawn from the public domain.146
B. The ProtectiveJurisdiction Doctnn«
The result of Colorado River is particularly disturbing in light of judicial and scholarly recognition of protective jurisdiction doctrine sanctioning the use of federal jurisdiction to protect federal interests even if state law provides the substantive rule of decision. In Clearfield Trust Co. v, United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), the Court held that the rights and duties of the United States on its issuance of commercial paper are governed by federal rather than state law. Pointing to the substantial federal interests involved, the Court observed: "The issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast scale and transactions in that paper from issuance to payment will commonly occur in several states. The application of state law, even without the conflict of laws rules of the forum, would subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great diversity in results by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of Thus, the Court came to view an essentially protective function-the assurance of a federal forum to vindicate important national interests-as a valid basis for congressional grants of federal jurisdiction. The Court has never retreated from this doctrine, and later Justices have supported the constitutional power of Congress to create federal jurisdiction for these protective purposes. For instance, in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfir Co. 152 three members of the majority recognized this power in upholding a statute granting federal jurisdiction over suits between citizens of the District of Columbia and citizens of other states, despite the absence of a threat to federal substantive policy.P" In Textile Workers Union o. Lincoln Mills, 154 two members of the majority interpreted the TaftHartley Act 155 to afford federal jurisdiction without first finding creation of federal common law and upheld this grant as an instance of protective jurisdiction.156
While the Colorado River litigation differs from protective jurisdiction cases because it involves both federal and state substantive law, the fundamental concern warranting protective jurisdiction is present with equal force. Clearly, important federal policies are at stake, policies to which state courts may be insensitive or hostile in water rights controversies.P? By erecting barriers such as one-sided factfinding or burdensome procedural rulings, 158 , concurring) . The case was a 7-1 decision, with the other 5 members of the majority upholding the Taft-Hartley Act's grant of federal jurisdiction in certain labor disputes on the ground that the Act was intended to create a federal common law of labor contracts as well as to grant federal jurisdiction. Id at 456. The lone dissenter, Justice Frankfurter, objected both to the view that Taft-Hartley created substantive law and to the exercise of a purely protective jurisdiction in the case. Id. at 473-77 (Frankfurter, j., dissenting). In a footnote, however, he perceived some room for the doctrine of protective jurisdiction in other cases where it is invoked by the federal government and when "federal law [is] in the forefront as a defense." Id. at 475 n.5. Colorado River presented these precise circumstances.
157 time to hear these cases.P? The fact that actual questions of federal substantive law are at issue reinforces the need for access to a federal forum. Therefore, the policies of protective jurisdiction should lead to preservation of access to the federal forum in the Colorado River context, to protect federal interests against state hostility, to ensure the fullest review of federal issues and to ensure uniform evaluation of recurrent types of reserved rights claims. In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is whether the Government intended to reserve unappropriated and thus available water. Intent is inferred if the previously unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the reservation was created.166
C. Problems in State Court
Unfortunately, the New Mexico court badly misapplied the Cappaert standard. In determining the purposes of the Gila National Forest reservation, the court focused on the Organic Act of 1897,167 in which Congress enumerated the purposes for which the national forests may be used: improving and protecting the forest; securing favorable water flows; and providing a continuous supply of timber. 168 The Mimbres Vafff)! court construed the Organic Act to exclude recreational use as a congressional purpose'P? and denied the federal reserved water rights claims. 170
To demonstrate that the Act's purposes could be construed to include recreational use, the United States pointed to a more recent congressional enactment, the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960.
171 This Act stated "that the national forests are established and shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes. 168. The pertinent provision is 16 U.S.C. § 475, which provides in part: "No national forest shall be established, except to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States; but it is not the purpose or intent of these provisions, or of said section, to authorize the inclusion therein of lands more valuable for the mineral therein, or for agricultural purposes, than for forest purposes."
169. 90 N.M. at 412-13, 564 P.2d at 617-18. 170. It/. at 412, 564 P.2d at 618. Perhaps the most plausible interpretation of the purpose of the 1960 Act is that it was intended to enumerate and ratify the various uses for the national forests which evolved after passage of the Organic Act of 1897, without close scrutiny of whether such uses were strictly within the bounds of the Organic Act. This is suggested by the following statement in the House Report on the 1960 Act: "The Act ofJune 4, 1897 . . . refers both to watersheds and timber as purposes for which the national forests are established. Through the years by a number of congressional enactments, including appropriations for carrying out specific activities and functions, through court decisions, and through policy directives and statements, the management of the national forests under the principle of multiple use has been thoroughly recognized and accepted. The application of the principle of sustained-yield management has also been thoroughly established. It is thus desirable that the Secretary of Agriculture have a directive to administer the national forests under the dual principles of multiple use and sustained yield." Id. clarify nor to expand the purposes for which the Gila National Forest had been established under the Organic Act of 1897.
175 Therefore, under the Cappaert decision, the federal government had no claim to reserved water rights for recreational purposes. 176 The court's holding reflects a serious misunderstanding of how federal reserved rights may vest. Although previous cases, including Cappaert, have referred to the purposes at the time of creation as the benchmark for determining federal reserved rights,'?" reserved rights can also vest as a result of Congress' subsequent expansion of those purposes.F" so long as they fall within the authority of the commerce and property clauses of the Constitution.'?" The only other restriction on such expanded federal claims is that they exist in previously unappropriated waters.P? Thus, while the New Mexico Supreme Court may have correctly held that recreational use did not become applying this holding to the case before it, the Mimbres Valley court ignored an important distinction between the two cases. The IzaaJ: Walton decision involved a purpose clearly antithetical to the special sale of timber provision of the Organic Act, and held that the 1960 Act had not served to repeal that provision. In Mimbres Valley, on the other hand, the court was faced with a purpose-recreational use-which in no way contradicted the general provisions-of § 475 of that Act, but was instead either "supplemental" to or included within those provisions.
175. 90 N.M. at 413, 562 P.2d at 618. The court stated: "The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 does not have a retroactive effect nor can it broaden the purposes for which the Gila National Forest was established under the Organic Act of 1897." Id. Unless "broaden" is read to mean "clarify," the court's conclusion is either redundant or indicative of the view that the 1960 Act was not intended to allow the Forest Service to claim a 1960 priority for reserved rights incident to the newly expressed purposes.
Interestingly, dicta in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion reach a similar conclusion by a different method. After construing the later announced purposes to be "secondary," United States v. New Mexico, 98 S. Ct. 3012, 3018 (1978) (emphasis in original), to the favorable water flow purpose of the 1897 Organic Act, Justice Rehnquist notes that withdrawal of water for these purposes might adversely affect water flows. The ineffable conclusion follows that, "Congress intended the national forests to be administered for broader purposes after 1960 but there is no indication that it believed the new purposes to be so crucial as to require a reservation of additional water. an operative purpose until enactment of the 1960 Act, the opinion failed to broach the crucial question of the existence and amount of unappropriated waters in the Rio Mimbres at that time. To the extent that such waters were available-and the Mimbres Valley opinion contains some evidence to suggest that there may have been such available water l 8 1-the United States should have been granted sufficient water rights to satisfy the purpose of recreational use of the Gila National Forest. By failing to recognize this aspect of Cappaert, the New Mexico Supreme Court demonstrated the danger state court adjudication poses to important federal policies. As Colorado River effectively removes similar reserved rights questions from federal forums l 8 2 the opportunities for inadequate factfinding and for mishandling of delicate federal questions increase. The Supreme Court will be the only resort for federal judicial review of state court adjudications that appear to deal inadequately or incompetently with complex reserved rights issues. 183 On a different level, it is noteworthy that no state law issues were ruled upon by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Mimbres Valley.184 The sole subject of adjudication was the question of federal reserved rights. This situation runs counter to Justice Brennan's assertion in Colorado River that water rights issues are highly interdependent. 185 Mimbres Valley shows that reserved rights issues often receive distinct treatment within the unitary state system, confirming the position of the dissenters in Colorado River186 and discrediting the notion that judicial economy will be served by denial of the federal forum in Winters rights cases. 187 181. The court noted that the appeal had also raised the question of whether water rights used by permittees of the United States Forest Service should be adjudicated under state law provisions for prior appropriations or whether they were to be charged to the general federal allocation. The court held that since the permittees were using water which, under its holding, the federal government had no rights in, the permittees must perfect their claims in accordance with state law, as prior appropriators. See90 N.M. at 414, 564 P.2d at 619. If the water rights claimed by these permittees were unappropriated as of enactment of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, then such rights should have vested at that time.
182 187. There are, however, some advantages in having all rights determined by a specialized tribunal. Although federal reserved rights are different in kind from state appropria-
IV. THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL FORUM IN INDIAN RESERVED RIGHTS CASES: THE UNIQUE STATUS OF INDIAN RIGHTS
The significance of the Colorado Rioer decision extends beyond its emphasis upon state adjudication of federal reserved water rights, for the rights at issue belonged to Indian claimants. In the majority opinion, Justice Brennan failed to consider the potential consequences of relegating Indian rights claims to the state courts. The opinion restricted itself to considering "whether the McCarran Amendment provided consent to determine federal reserved rights on behalf ofIndians in state court."188 This narrow focus on statutory intent ignores problems unique to Indian ownership of federal reserved water rights.
Justice Brennan advanced two arguments to support his conclusion that Indian water rights merit the same treatment afforded to other federal reserved rights claims. Eagle County held that, under the McCarran Amendment, federal reserved water rights could be adjudicated in state court, and, in dictum, said that this was true of all other reserved rights which the government "otherwise" owned. 189 Justice Brennan in the Colorado Rioer opinion blandly extended that logic to apply to adjudication of Indian rights, reasoning that a contrary decision would violate the McCarran Amendment's purpose by hindering state efficiency. Because the federal interests in maintaining federal jurisdiction, however, are so great.P? the majority would have to argue that confining the whole litigation to state courts is vastly more efficient than federal determination of the magnitude and priority of federal reserved rights and subsequent state integration of these rights into a unified system for administration of water rights. As the dissent in Colorado Rioer explained, such a showing cannot be made. The existing Colorado scheme is bifurcated; one proceeding quantifies and gives a priority date while the other proceeding integrates quantified claims. Thus, the dissent concluded, [I] f this suit were allowed to proceed in federal court the same procedures would be followed, and the federal court decree would be incorporated into the state tabulation, as other federal court detive rights, their quantification depends to some extent on estimating the appropriate amount ofwater required to support the intended level of consumptive use. A specialized state tribunal can probably make this determination more easily than could the federal judiciary. For a discussion of the difficulties of such determinations, see Ranquist, supranote 18, at 659-62. In the past, some federal courts have appointed a master to ascertain water requirements. crees have been incorporated in the past. Thus, the same process will occur regardless of which forum considers these claims. 191
Absent a demonstration of significant efficiency gains, the majority in Colorado River failed to meet the traditionally high burden associated with abdication of federal judicial duties.P? Moreover, many factors unique to Indian reserved water rights demand special treatment of such claims. These include the possibility of state court bias, Indian perceptions of state courts, the historical basis for special treatment of Indians, and the federal trusteeship of Indian property.
A. The Possibilz?;J ofState Bias
Both majority and dissent in Colorado River avoided openly acknowledging that state courts might be biased against Indians. An awareness of this possibility, however, is apparent in both opinions. The majority states:
[T]he Government's argument [as Trustee for the Indians] rests on the incorrect assumption that consent to state jurisdiction for the purpose of determining water rights imperils those rights . . . . Mere subjection of Indian rights to legal challenge in state court, however, would no more imperil those rights than would a suit brought by the Government in district court for their declaration. 193
The dissent in turn responds:
It is not necessary to determine that there is no state-court jurisdiction of these claims to support the proposition that a federal court is a more appropriate forum than a state court for determination of questions of life-and-death importance to Indians. This Court has long recognized that "[t]he policy ofleaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history.,,194
Thinly veiled below the surface of both opinions is a recognition of the multi-faceted problem of potential state-court bias against Indians. Although it is difficult to establish there is such a bias, an amicus brief, filed by the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, specifically asserted that such a bias exists.l'" The brief, however, did not present 201. As one commentator states in a discussion of bias and prejudice in the diversity context: "Actual prejudice aside, there remains the matter of the appearance of prejudice, or the belief of an out-of-state party that he may be the victim of prejudice. As the ALI Study argued, the out-of-stater may be more willing to accept defeat with good grace, and not to attribute it to local bias, in a federal than in a state court. This is a matter of no little consequence in a nation that prides itself not only on doing justice, but on being seen to do justice." Shapiro, the fairness of a legal system must include an exploration of the perceptions of those subject to that system.P" Without attempting to canvass the strengths and weaknesses of this argument,one can still use it as a starting point for considering the Indian's view of state courts. Absent a strong countervailing interest, a just society will try to remedy a condition which any substantial group perceives as unfair or discriminatory in order to maintain its reputation for impartiality. 203 Indians clearly fear state court hostility to rights which are of paramount importance to their physical and cultural survival.F'" Indian experience in state courts has led to distrust; the group now views the state court as an agency of repression. 203. Professor Michelman perhaps best sums up the appropriate inquiry: "Rawls's theory attracts our attention because it is concerned.with inequalities in the treatment-the quota of powers, honors, andincomes-received by individuals under collectively maintained arrangements. A cogent attempt is made to clarify the idea ofjustice as the special virtue of social arrangements within which such inequalities become acceptable. They are said to be acceptable-the arrangements producing them are deemed just-if those arrangements are consistent with principles-which could-command the assent of every member of a group of rational, self-regarding persons, convening under circumstances of mutually acknowledged equality and interdependence, to hammer out principles by which they will judge complaints against whatever rules and institutions may come to characterize their association. All of these persons are presumed to be aware that each is powerless either to impose his preferences on any other or to claim for himself, in advance, any particular position which may be constituted by a rule or institution. Social practices, then, are to be judged by principles which a person would favor ifhe had to assume that he might occupy the least advantageous position distinguishable under any rule or institution which might emerge." Michelman, supra note 202, at 1219. The relevant question, therefore, is whether one placed in the position ofIndians, the group disadvantaged by the policy choice implicit in Colorado River, would reasonably insist on protection against that predicament. to hostile State courts to adjudicate Indian water rights. "206 Attendant upon the perceived hostility is a sense of injustice and unfairness. The voiced societal interest competing with the Indian's perceptions is the benefit of giving certainty to claimed state water rights in the arid West. But society will gain this benefit, however, wherever the Indian claims are determined.F'" Thus, the only benefit of choosing the state forum is administrative convenience, and even this benefit may be of limited value. 208 When the interests are balanced against one another, the benefits of administrative convenience simply do not justify the subjection of Indians to perceived hostility and injustice.
C. Historical Basisfor Special Treatment ofIndians
American Indians historically have received special treatment from the federal government. As a result of the original status of Indian tribes as sovereignties, legal relations with Indians were instituted by treaty. The United States ConstitutiorrP? required that governmental interaction with the Indians take place on the federal level. More significantly, Congress has traditionally insulated the Indians from state governmental and judicial control.F'? The executive branch of the federal government has established a special trust relationship with respect to Indian property and has developed a massive bureaucracy concerned with Indian problems. This distinct status, independent of traditional state jurisdiction, received early judicial sanction and congressional acceptance''!' which have continued virtually unbroken.P''
The federal jurisdictional interest in suits involving Indians also receives unequivocal judicial support. For example, in Oneida Indian Nation o: CountJl ofOneida,213 a unanimous Supreme Court held that an ejectment action brought by Indians, unlike suits by non-Indian claimants, conferred federal question jurisdiction. In support of the Oneida ruling the Court pointed out, "state authorities have not easily accepted the notion that federal law and federal courts must be deemed the controlling considerations in dealing with the Indians. "214
D. Federal Trusteeship ofIndian Property
The nature of the federal trusteeship of Indian property buttresses the conclusion that adjudication of Indian Winters rights claims should not be relegated to the state courts. The executive is not the only branch with obligations to the Indians; the fulfillment of the federal trusteeship requires the involvement of the other branches of government as well. The cooperation of Congress is needed, as is superintendence by the judiciary. In light of this tripartite nature of the trusteeship, it is surprising that the Colorado River decision determined congressional intent to include Indian rights in the McCarran Amendment.P"
The trusteeship may also bear on Colorado River in a more subtle way. A court adjudicating Indian Winters claims may have to consider the diligence with which the federal government has exercised its trusteeship.F'" The Indians charge that breaches of trust have repeatedly occurred when Congress has appropriated funds for reclamation water projects on streams in which Indians have Winters claims without providing sufficient capital to the Indians for develop-214. Id. at 678. The Court was careful to reaffirm the general principle that controversies over land do not raise federal questions for jurisdictional purposes solely because original title may have derived from the United States. The Court found a federal question because of the not insubstantial claim that federal law protects, and has continuously protected from "the time of the formation of the United States, possessory right to tribal lands, wholly apart from the application ofstate law principles which normally and separately protect a valid right of possession." Id. at 677.
215. Indeed, even as construed in the Colorado RilJercase, the McCarran Amendment does not grant exclusive jurisdiction over Indian reserved water rights to the states. Su note 35 mpraand accompanying text. Nevertheless, the Court's interpretation of the Amendment vests forum choice solely in the hands of the non-Indian parties, so it is now within their power to frustrate an earlier choice of forum by Indian claimants.
216. Although the Supreme Court has noted there are "high standards for fair dealing required of the United States in controlling Indian affairs," United States v. Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 47 (1946), one federal circuit judge has noted: "From the very beginnings of this nation, the chief issue around which federal Indian policy has revolved has been, not how to assimilate the Indian nations whose lands we usurped, but how best to transfer Indian lands and resources to non-Indians." United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 337 (9th Cir. 1956) (quoting Van When litigation of Winters rights involves a claim of breach of federal trust, even an absolutely unbiased state court water judge may be totally unfamiliar with the nature of that federal trust responsibility.P" In addition, state courts lack authority to compel performance of federal trust responsibilities relating to case preparation. 220 Thus, the trusteeship analysis, like the perceptions and historical analyses, demonstrates that the adjudication of Indian Winters rights claims should not he relegated to the state courts.
217. The Indians, lacking money to make use of the appropriable water, must helplessly watch non-Indian state law appropriators flourish. Su, e.g., Water RightsHean"ngs, supra note 204, at 4-6, 9, 48, 56-58 (testimony of various speakers representing Indian interests). For a discussion of how the increased emphasis on coal extraction in the West and the concomitant need for large quantities of water threaten Indian reserved rights, see Veeder, Were Indians to exercise their water rights, conflict with other appropriators would certainly arise. Those charged with federal water planning have recognized that "[tJhe most intractable problem. " . is the conflict between existing non-Indian uses and newly initiated Indian withdrawals. While the Indians often have legal superiority to make use of water, a later initiated Indian use often would disrupt preexisting non-Indian uses representing large Federal, State, and private investments." UNITED STATES NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 54, at 163-64. As more non-Indian appropriators invest in reliance on state water rights which are legalIy inferior to the dormant Indian Winters rights, there is less Indian hope of ever obtaining use of that water. Combined with the previous failure of the federal government to aid Indian economic development dependent on water use, the government's hesitancy to disrupt massive prior investment justifies the Indians' fear that their Winters rights will atrophy. See, e.g., Water Rights Heanngs, supranote 204, at 6 (testimony of Robert Lewis, President, National Tribal Chairmen's Association).
Confiscation ofIndian Winters Rights in the Upper
218. The federal government must upgrade the level of legal and technical assistance given to the Indians to enable them to participate successfulIy in quantification hearings. Absent such preparation for adjudication, even the interpretation of the McCarran Amendment suggested in this Article represents a grave threat to Indian mntersrights. Under the view of both this Article and the Court in Colorado Rillet; non-Indian parties can force immediate quantification of the mnters rights; the crucial disagreement involves whether federal courts should be available to make these determinations if the Indians would prefer them. Since non-Indians may be the moving parties for quantification in either case, however, it is likely that Indian claimants often will have inadequate opportunity to prepare for litigation. This Article has argued that the interests favoring federal adjudication of reserved rights claims outweigh the actual efficiency gains, if any, that will result from relegating these claims to the state courts. The interests favoring a federal forum are especially strong when reserved rights are being claimed on behalf of American Indians. Although the Court's decision in Colorado Riller begins to close the door on concurrent jurisdiction for Indian claims, the trend can still be reversed. Ideally, the Court should reexamine Colorado Riller, both by reconsidering whether all reserved rights claims can be separated from the determination of prior appropriation rights and by explicitly weighing the long-standing unique status of American Indians. Alternatively, Congress should intervene and clarify the McCarran Amendment so as to provide specific guarantees of access to the federal forum.F" Short of such major reforms, the federal district courts will be left to strike a new balance on a case-by-case basis, by declining to dismiss or remand Indian reserved rights claims. While lower courts cannot directly defy the policies set forth by the Supreme Court in Colorado Riller, they can narrow the opinion's impact by drawing factual and procedural distinctions in later cases.
2 22 Otherwise, these re-221. Unfortunately, current legislation seems to be moving in the wrong direction. A bill recently proposed by Representative Meeds of Washington, se« 123 CONGo REC. HI2,195-96 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1977), would require the filing of suits for adjudication and quantification of all federal reserved rights for the use and benefit of Indian reservations within 5 years of its enactment. All claims not filed within that period would be extinguished. Moreover, the bill would limit such claims, "if proven, to be quantified in the amount of highest annual actual permissible uses, as defined in this Act in any of the five years preceding January 1, 1977." Id. While not only severely limiting the scope of Indian reserved rights claims, the proposed bill would leave the existing scheme of McCarran Amendment jurisdiction unaltered. &e id.
222. Indeed, Justice Brennan's opinion was limited to a justification of the district court's dismissal "in this particular case." 424 U.S. at 820. He added, "We need not decide, for example, whether, despite the McCarran Amendment, dismissal would be warranted if more extensive proceedings had occurred in the District Court prior to dismissal, if the involvement of state water rights were less extensive than it is here, or if the state proceeding were in some respect inadequate to resolve the federal claims." Id. The first and third examples offer little real prospect for distinguishing later cases, as long as defendants move to dismiss or remand promptly and state legislatures act to conform their adjudicatory proceedings to the Colorado model. Su notes 105-31 supra and accompanying text. The second example, which concerns the extent of state involvement, might be a valid ground of distinction where the United States seeks only federal adjudication of federal reserved rights, as opposed to determination of both reserved rights and rights granted under state law, such as was involved in Colorado River. &e424 U.S. at 805. Finally, in states considering bills which would establish general adjudication systems, seenotes 111-23 supraand accompanying text, the best interests of the United States and Indian claimants would be served by prompt filing
